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I.

INTRODUCTION

Convictions and the potential incarceration of parents have a
severe effect on the lives of their children who are left as helpless
victims in the process.1 A woman in Texas had her parental rights
* Juris Doctor, UIC John Marshall Law School, 2020; B.A., University of
Missouri, 2016.
1. Dan Levin, As More Mothers Fill Prisons, Children Suffer ‘A Primal
Wound’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/us/prison283
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terminated as to her three children after testing positive on a drug
test, following a conviction for writing bad checks.2 Not only are her
children left without one of their parents, but they are also facing
the severe effects that result from the disruption of their family.3
Depending on the state, parents who have been convicted of a
variety of crimes may never regain the right to parent their
children.4 When children are taken from the care of their parents,
it has been noted that “[l]osing your children is the ultimate price
to pay.”5 These scenarios present the question: to what extent
should a parent or guardian’s prior convictions be used to terminate
his or her rights to a child? When criminal convictions are used
against a parent or guardian as grounds for termination of his or
her parental rights to a minor child, it becomes difficult to
determine, based on several different factors, whether the
termination of parental rights should occur.6 Oftentimes, states rely
on the use of criminal convictions as grounds for termination of
parental rights.7 However, this reliance has resulted in the
potential problem of violating the due process rights of parents and
children being left in precarious situations.
The purpose of this Comment is to explore how state systems,
particularly Illinois’ system that relies on the three felony
conviction rule as automatic grounds for a finding of depravity in
seeking the termination of parental rights, presents potential due
process violations. Part II of this Comment will explain the theories
behind child custody, including the liberty interests of parents and
what constitutes the best interests of the child. This section will
then also assess the overall process of the termination of parental
rights in the United States, including a focused look at New
Hampshire, California, and Illinois. Part III will analyze and
explore the differences exhibited by Illinois in the execution of its

mothers-children.html (presenting the difficult situations that occur
throughout the United States when parental rights are involuntarily
terminated, and the effects that these terminations have on children).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see generally Child Welfare Information Gateway, Determining the
Best Interests of the Child, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Mar. 2016),
www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best_interest.pdf (setting forth the various
grounds that states use when deciding whether to involuntarily terminate a
parent’s rights to his or her child).
5. Levin, supra note 1.
6. See In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d 102, 116-17 (Ill. 2018) (presenting the idea that
each parental termination case is different, and the difficulties that may be
presented when the court needs to determine if a conviction, based off a statute
declared unconstitutional, can be used to terminate a father’s parental rights to
his minor child).
7. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i) (2020) (showing how Illinois’s
statutory language for termination of parental rights, includes a finding of
unfitness based off of specific criminal convictions, that typically relate to a
child or a child’s parent, or a combination of any three felony convictions).
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system of terminating parental rights and the due process concerns
that are raised. Part IV then proposes the direct changes that
Illinois needs to make to its current system, with adoptions of
provisions from the New Hampshire and California systems for the
involuntary termination of parental rights. These changes will
result in the elimination of the automatic finding of depravity for
deciding to terminate parental rights based on three felony
convictions.

II. BACKGROUND
The following sections will set forth the background behind
child custody in the United States. Part A will discuss overall
theories behind child custody, including a necessary focus on the
best interests of the child. Part B will then explain systems set forth
by Congress, to be adopted by the states. This section will also
include a look at the relevant termination systems and statutes
used by New Hampshire and California. Part C will discuss the
system used by Illinois when terminating parental rights and the
problems presented in the implementation of its strict statutory
provisions.

A. Theories Behind Child Custody
Child custody and parental termination hearings involve a
judge making a determination as to what is in the “best interest of
the child.”8 The judge will make the determination whether parents
will be allocated parenting time based on an evaluation of the best
interests of the child.9 This consideration requires the court to look
at all relevant factors, which may include whether there is any
evidence of abuse in the household, if a parent is a convicted sex
offender, and the wishes of the child.10 Custody or parenting time
means that the parent has “the right to direct the child’s activities
and to make decisions regarding the child’s care and control,
education, health and religion.”11 However, it is not always simple
for courts to determine what is truly in the best interests of the
child.12 Specifically, it is not entirely clear how to define the best
8. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.7 (2016) (describing the numerous factors
that are considered by Illinois courts when deciding what is in the best interest
of the child).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Parental custody, 12 ILL. FORMS LEGAL & BUS. § 38:24 (2019); see 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/600(e) (2017) (defining parenting time as the primary period
when a parent performs in a caretaker role for his or her child, apart from
making important decisions).
12. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum
Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q.
381, 384-85 (2008) (describing the difficulty, as time has gone on, in determining
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interests of the child; rather, it is for the judge to make this
determination during a hearing involving child custody and
whether to terminate parental rights.13
In making these determinations, the United States Supreme
Court has established that there is a fundamental right to parent,
and this right “does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child.”14
Therefore, loss of custody of a child and the possible subsequent
termination of parental rights is a carefully weighed process that
must not deny a parent his or her guaranteed due process rights.15
Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that when proceedings
begin to involuntarily terminate parental rights, there is an
increased need for proper procedures to be used and more protection
afforded to parents.16 As a result, when parents are faced with
termination of parental rights hearings, it is recognized that there
is a greater need for the court to protect the process by allowing for
increased protections for the parents.17
The greater need for protection is based on the recognition of
the Supreme Court’s assertion that parental rights are a
fundamental right.18 As it has been established that parental rights
are fundamental, strict scrutiny must be applied when courts assess
whether due process rights are alleged to have been violated.19 If a
what is in the best interest of the child when making general custodial decisions
and the long-lasting, detrimental effects this could have on the child when being
removed from his or her parents’ care).
13. See Allison Glade Behjani, Delegation of Judicial Authority to Experts:
Professional and Constitutional Implications of Special Masters in ChildCustody Proceedings, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 823, 825 (2007) (explaining the judge’s
use of professionals, such as child psychologists and mental health
professionals, to aid him or her in making determinations as to what would be
in the child’s best interest); see also Janet M. Bowermaster, Legal Presumptions
and the Role of Mental Health Professionals in Child Custody Proceedings, 40
DUQ. L. REV. 265, 270 (2002) (explaining that mental health professionals will
be allowed to make recommendations to the court in order to help the judge
make a decision that is ultimately in the child’s best interests).
14. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) (analyzing
the equal rights of mothers and fathers in child custody hearings that guarantee
due process to both sides).
16. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54 (providing an explanation that when states
proceed in forcibly taking parental rights away, there is an increased need for
guaranteed procedural rights).
17. Id.
18. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (asserting that there is
a fundamental right to parent and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects this right); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (establishing the right of individuals to raise children, which is
recognized amongst the protected fundamental rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution).
19. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 59 (2000) (showing that when the
fundamental right to parent is potentially infringed, then strict scrutiny must
be used).
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statute is alleged to infringe on a fundamental right, leading to a
potential due process violation, then it must be shown that the
challenged statute survives a strict scrutiny analysis.20
Furthermore, when a statute is challenged under strict scrutiny, on
the basis of infringing on the fundamental right to parent, it must
be shown that the government has a compelling interest in
infringing on the right and the statute must be narrowly tailored to
achieve its compelling interest.21

B. Termination of Parental Rights in the United States
Over time, Congress has developed regulations regarding the
termination of parental rights and for children being removed from
the care of their biological parents.22 In particular, Congress has
established grounds to determine when parental rights should be
terminated.23 Oftentimes the grounds Congress uses to determine
custody and whether parental rights should be terminated results
in someone other than the biological parents being granted custody
of the child.24 Involuntary termination of one’s parental rights is a
last resort and serious undertaking by the state.25 Thus, Congress
passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”) to
govern the child adoption process and the regulations that govern
the foster care system.26 ASFA also provides guidelines for
adoptions that ensue as a result of the termination of parental
rights.27 Additionally, ASFA sets out guidelines for the foster care
system, including the process of awarding legal guardianship and
the termination of parental rights.28 Of note, ASFA mandates
termination of parental rights if certain crimes have been
committed, including murder or manslaughter of the child’s sibling

20. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553-54 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that infringements to fundamental liberty interests are valid when
they are able to survive a strict scrutiny analysis).
21. Hamit v. Hamit, 715 N.W.2d 512, 526-27 (Neb. 2006) (“Under strict
scrutiny review, the law must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” (quoting
Douglas Cty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Neb. 2005)).
22. See generally Elizabeth O’Connor Tomlinson, Termination of Parental
Rights Under Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), 115 AM. JUR. TRIALS 465
(2020) (discussing the provisions put in place by Congress when enacting the
ASFA).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 9.
25. Id. § 16.
26. Judge Ernestine Steward Gray, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997, 46 LA. B.J. 477, 478 (1999) (analyzing the history of the passage of the
ASFA and the resulting effects on the foster and adoption system within the
United States).
27. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675 (West 2018).
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and felony assault against the child or sibling.29 However,
“incarceration alone does not provide grounds for termination of
parental rights although a parent's incarceration may be considered
along with other factors in determining whether parental rights can
be terminated.”30 States have taken ASFA and adopted it to their
own statutes governing the foster care system and adoption
processes.31 This incorporation includes the termination of parental
rights as a penalty for prior felony convictions.32
When considering incarceration and felony convictions as
grounds for termination of parental rights, ASFA looks to a variety
of factors.33 The following considerations are examples used by
ASFA: murder, felony assault involving a child or another child of
the parent, and whether the court previously terminated the subject
parent’s rights to another child.34 Therefore, the ASFA sets basic
grounds for the state to adhere to within their own foster and
adoption systems.35 However, many states have adopted their own
respective statutes that set strict guidelines for termination of
parental rights to a minor.36
1. Termination of Parental Rights in New Hampshire
In its revised statutes, New Hampshire takes a different
approach when determining whether parental rights should be
29. Id. § 675(5)(E) (further explaining that among crimes committed, the
ASFA requires that parental rights must be terminated for an abandoned child
or for a child that has been in foster care for “15 of the most recent 22 months”).
30. M. Elaine Buccieri et al., Determinative Factors, 43 C.J.S. INFANTS § 27
(Mar. 2020) (delineating the numerous factors that the court can use when
making a determination whether to involuntarily terminate parental rights);
see also In re Adoption of C.M., 414 S.W.3d 622, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)
(explaining that before parental rights can be involuntarily terminated, an
analysis needs to be done as to whether the subject child is being harmed by the
parent or whether the child could be harmed in the future if parental rights are
allowed to stay in place).
31. See Katherine A. Hort, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest
of the Child? ASFA’s Guidelines for the Termination of Parental Rights, 28
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1879, 1881 (2001) (noting that to be in compliance with
reunification requirements under the ASFA, states have adopted broad
approaches; these state-specific approaches are different from state to state).
32. See, e.g., In re Vivienne Bobbi-Hadiya S., 126 A.D.3d 545, 547 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2015) (holding that a father’s parental rights were properly terminated
following abuse, neglect and a prior manslaughter conviction); see also In re
E.A., 114 A.3d 207, 210 (Me. 2015) (finding that a father’s parental rights were
properly terminated by the state after he was charged with assault for hitting
one of his children).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675.
34. Id. § 675(5)(E).
35. Id.
36. See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269 (2018) (setting forth provisions
that the court must follow when considering whether to terminate parental
rights). The statute provides various grounds for the court to consider when
deciding whether a parent is unfit. Id.
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terminated.37 The relevant statute provides that parental rights can
be terminated, for example, as a result of abandonment of the child,
neglect, and mental instability of the parent.38 However, in
recognition of the difficult decisions that must be made in
termination proceedings, the parents are granted a 12 month period
to correct conditions that led to a state determination of neglect or
abuse.39 Furthermore, when using convictions as a consideration for
termination, New Hampshire notes that convictions for murder,
manslaughter, or felony assault of a child or the child’s other parent,
will be used as grounds for termination of parental rights.40
However, for all other felony convictions, New Hampshire allows for
a case-by-case determination to be made as to whether the
conviction and incarceration would have so great an effect on the
child, that termination of the parent’s rights would be proper.41
Therefore, for convictions other than murder, manslaughter, or
felony assault, the New Hampshire state court will make a case-bycase analysis to determine if the felony conviction, combined with
the possible prison time, will lead to the child being detrimentally
affected and “deprived of proper parental care and protection.”42
Furthermore, New Hampshire’s process of assessing whether a
felony conviction should constitute grounds for termination of
parental rights leaves the court to make a decision that ultimately
must be in the best interests of the child.43
Although incarceration can be used, New Hampshire does
warn that the parent’s incarceration cannot be the sole factor when
deciding whether to terminate parental rights.44 A case-by-case
analysis needs to be done by the court, considering incarceration
amongst all other relevant factors for the termination of parental
rights.45 Additionally, a party must seek termination and the

37. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5 (2020).
38. Id. § 170-C:5(vi).
39. Id. § 170-C:5(iii) (delineating the standard that before parental rights
are irretrievably terminated, parents have twelve months to mitigate
circumstances that led to a finding of abuse or neglect); see, e.g., In re Jonathan
T., 808 A.2d 82, 85 (N.H. 2002) (applying § 170-C:5(iii), the court found that
parental rights were properly terminated after the parents were given the
chance, yet failed to mitigate the circumstances that resulted in their children
being removed from their care).
40. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-C:5(vii).
41. Id. § 170-C:5(vi) (asserting that although a felony conviction may be used
as grounds for termination of parental rights, it will be left for the court, on a
case-by-case basis, to decide whether the child is left adversely affected by the
nature of the crime or the period of incarceration).
42. Id. § 170-C:5(vi).
43. John Burdeau, Termination of Relationship, 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT &
CHILD § 16 (2020).
44. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(vi) (implementing in New Hampshire
that the mere fact a parent is in prison does not mean that it can be the only
factor considered by the court in terminating parental rights).
45. Burdeau, supra note 43.
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evidence presented must prove that termination is proper beyond a
reasonable doubt.46 Then, if a statutory ground is found as a basis
for termination, the court will look to the best interests of the child
and make a final determination as to the status of the parent’s
rights to his or her child.47
However, when relying on statutory grounds to terminate
parental rights, it is noted that the child’s best interest is considered
to be more determinative and more important than the interests of
the parents, who are contesting the involuntary termination of their
parental rights.48 Therefore, the child’s welfare will be considered
more important than that of the parent, but the due process rights
of parents must still be recognized and adhered to.49 Although the
child’s interests are considered of utmost importance when deciding
whether to terminate parental rights, the state does recognize, in
its own constitution, that parents have guaranteed due process
rights.50 Thus, in seeking termination of parental rights, New
Hampshire recognizes the due process rights of parents but finds
that so long as these requirements are met, the child’s welfare is
more important than a parent’s interests.51
2. Termination of Parental Rights in California
California, in adopting provisions from the AFSA, also provides
a broad basis for determining whether parental rights should be

46. In re Haley K., 37 A.3d 377, 379, 381-82 (N.H. 2012) (holding that a
violation of a statute had to be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, before
parental rights were terminated, and the father’s incarceration was not the sole
ground for terminating his parental rights).
47. In re C.M., 103 A.3d 1192, 1199 (N.H. 2014) (quoting In re Sophia-Marie
H., 77 A.3d 1139 (N.H. 2013)) (noting that after a statutory ground is found as
a basis for termination, the court’s primary concern must be in the child’s best
interest before terminating parental rights); see also In re Antonio W., 790 A.2d
125, 129 (N.H. 2002) (showing that statutory grounds must be established
before parental rights are terminated, but the ultimate decision the court makes
must be in the best interests of the child, beyond the statutory grounds).
48. In re Adam R., 992 A.2d 697, 707 (N.H. 2010) (asserting that when the
court decides whether to terminate parental rights, the best interest and
welfare of the child must be the ultimate concern of the court, over the interests
of the parents).
49. Id. at 700 (recognizing that although there is a fundamental right to
parent, the state can step in where necessary so long as it acts properly under
due process).
50. Id. (ruling that “Parental rights are ‘natural, essential, and inherent’
within the meaning of Part I, Article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution”);
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2 (stating that “[a]ll men have certain natural, essential,
and inherent rights—among which are, the enjoying and defending life and
liberty,” and going on assert the due process rights of citizens where “[e]quality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state on account
of race, creed, color, sex, or national origin”).
51. In re Adam R., 992 A.2d at 707.
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terminated as a result of felony convictions.52 The state provides,
through its own statutes, general grounds for termination of
parental rights.53 For example, California has established that
grounds for termination include abandonment of the child, abuse of
another child, and mental disability of the parent.54 The governing
California statute notes that two requirements must be met to
determine whether convictions should be used as automatic
grounds for termination of parental rights.55 The first ground that
must be met is whether the parent has a prior felony conviction.56
Subsequently, the court must then decide whether the felony
conviction and the facts associated with it would result in finding
that the parent is unfit.57 Therefore, a fact-based analysis must be
done as to whether prior crimes will be determinative factors in the
ultimate decision whether to terminate parental rights.58
Accordingly, if it is established that the child’s parent is a convicted
felon, the court can then decide whether the crime and the facts
associated with it would make the parent unfit.59 This broad basis
allows courts to establish the types of crimes that make a parent
unfit and whether any prior crimes create concern for the court as
to the parent’s ability to care for his or her child.60 Notably, most
courts in California have recognized “unfitness” to mean “a
probability that the parent will fail in a substantial degree to
discharge parental duties toward [the] child.”61
52. But see Jana Micek, Termination of Parental Rights Based on a Felony
Conviction, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 565, 566 (1999) (arguing that because
courts are given a large amount of discretion in finding bases for an unfit
parent, this leads to a lack of clarity in establishing how to regularly find
unfitness. As California is loose in its interpretation of what convictions
constitute parental unfitness, this has resulted in courts making “decisions
[that] are sometimes inconsistent and unpredictable”).
53. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2018).
54. Id. at (b)(2),(9), and (i)(4).
55. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a) (West 2020).
56. Id. § 7825(a)(1) (establishing that in order to find a conviction as grounds
for termination of parental rights, it must first be found whether one or both
parents have a felony conviction).
57. Id. § 7825(a)(2) (asserting that the court needs to determine whether the
actual crime, along with any criminal record the parent has, makes the parent
unfit, rather than broadly allowing for any crime to be used as grounds for
termination). But see Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & The State: The
Construction of a New Family Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78
(2011) (arguing that the California, and other state standards of allowing for
incarcerations to be considered, as part of the best interests analysis, fails to
consider the interests of parents when proceedings are initiated to terminate
parental rights).
58. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a)(2).
59. Id.
60. Micek, supra note 52, at 566 (noting that the court’s fact-based
determination allows it to examine whether a felony conviction would allow it
to find the convictions as proper grounds for unfitness, before the court attempts
to terminate parental rights).
61. Id. (quoting In re Christina P., 175 Cal. App. 3d 115, 133 (Cal. Ct. App.
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California has further allowed for courts to find that certain
felonies or a pattern of prior crimes amount to a parent being unable
to properly care for his or her child.62 However, California has
warned that the mere fact that a parent has been convicted of a
felony does not automatically lead to a finding of parental
unfitness.63 Rather, the court must make a fact-based analysis
before ultimately deciding whether to terminate parental rights on
grounds of parental unfitness.64 Therefore, it must be shown that
the conviction itself, and the nature of the crime, must be the
ground for parental unfitness.65 Additionally, California courts are
allowed to use the parent’s criminal record in making the
determination of whether to terminate parental rights.66

C. Termination of Parental Rights in Illinois
The termination of parental rights in Illinois is governed in the
court system by the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act.67
First, a determination of parental fitness must be established under
the Adoption Act.68 Specifically, the Adoption Act asserts that a
parent’s rights to his or her child will be terminated if he or she is
deemed to be depraved.69 In particular, Illinois has strictly set forth
that grounds for depravity include any three felony convictions.70
Furthermore, at least one of the convictions, according to the
Adoption Act, must have occurred “within 5 years of the filing of the
petition or motion seeking termination of parental rights.”71
Therefore, Illinois sets a strict standard, where three felony
1985)).
62. See Micek, supra note 52, at 566 (noting that a felony, alone, is not
instant grounds in California for termination of parental rights). Rather, broad
terms are provided where unfitness needs to be shown based on the felony, on
a case-by-case basis. Id.
63. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a) (setting out proper grounds for termination of
parental rights, where a felony conviction can be used for a finding of unfitness
if the facts of a prior conviction support the court’s conclusion that it would be
in the child’s best interest and welfare).
64. Id.
65. See In re Terry E., 225 Cal. Rptr. 803, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (showing
that a conviction alone may not be grounds for termination of parental rights
as the mother was rehabilitated and had shown her ability to carry out her
duties as a parent).
66. Cal. Fam. CODE § 7825(a).
67. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 115-16 (mentioning that in Illinois, parental
rights can be involuntarily terminated only when the termination follows the
procedures set out by both the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act, where
various grounds are provided for proper termination).
68. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D) (explaining that there can be an official
finding of unfit if there was an abandonment of the child, desertion, continuous
or repetitive neglect, and extreme cruelty).
69. Id. § 50/1(D)(i).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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convictions are deemed to be automatic grounds for depravity,
resulting in the termination of parental rights, so long as one of
these convictions took place within five years of the official
proceedings for termination.72 Furthermore, depravity can also be
found and used by the court as a basis for termination of parental
rights on the grounds that the parent was previously convicted of a
single instance of first or second-degree murder.73 However, if first
or second-degree murder is used as grounds for termination, then
this particular conviction has to be within 10 years from the action
before the court.74
Additionally, incarceration of the parent is a factor that can be
considered in Illinois when determining whether a parent’s rights
should be terminated to his or her child.75 Notably, if the parent has
been incarcerated, even before the child has been born, then the
incarceration can be a factor if the court finds that the time spent
away from the child would have a significant effect on the child’s
needs and well-being.76 Therefore, convictions and incarcerations
are two factors that can be assessed in the decision to terminate
parental rights, based on the potential effects of the parent’s
incarceration on the child.77
The Juvenile Court Act of 1997 (the “Act”) also provides a
framework that the courts must follow in determining whether to
terminate parental rights in Illinois.78 The Act provides ways for the
Department of Child and Family Services (“DCFS”) to ensure the
safety of children and take necessary means of intervention when
the best interests of the child are not met.79 According to the Act, a
72. Id.; see, e.g., In re J.E., 2018 IL App (5th) 180149-U, ¶ 1 (holding that a
father’s parental rights were properly deprived as a result of his time in prison
and his lack of contact with his child before he actually entered prison).
73 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i) (finding that the proper grounds for
termination of parental rights and a finding of depravity includes convictions
for murder within the previous ten years).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 50/1(D)(r).
76. Jack K. Levin, Incarcerated Parent, 6A NICHOLS ILL. CIV. PRAC. § 114:62
(2019) (noting that a parent’s incarcerations do not have to be after the child is
born; the incarceration would need to have a significant effect on the parent’s
ability to care for the child); see also In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508, 521 (Ill.
2005) (holding that a mother’s rights to her child were properly terminated as
her repeated incarcerations prevented her from being able to raise her child,
and the incarcerations led to her inability to, “acquire the skills and knowledge
necessary,” to raise her child); see, e.g., In re D.D., 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1121 (Ill.
2001) (finding that a father’s repeated incarcerations led to his parental rights
being properly terminated and although the incarcerations were before his child
was born, he would be unable to properly provide for his child and take care of
the needs of his child).
77. Levin, supra note 76.
78. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-1 (2019).
79. Id. § 405/1-2(1) (noting that, “[t]he purpose of this Act is to secure for
each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own
home, as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical
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parent needs to be found unfit, under the Adoption Act, before the
court proceeds in terminating parental rights.80 The standard by
which the court must establish unfitness is clear and convincing
evidence.81 Furthermore, in conjunction with the Illinois Adoption
Act, the Juvenile Courts Act of 1997 will be used to ensure the
placement of children as directed by juvenile courts and the Illinois
Department of Child and Family Services.82
Illinois utilizes a “three-strike” felony conviction rule as
grounds for the finding of depravity in the termination of parental
rights, but this strict rule presents a host of problems in its
implementation.83 Congress took a broad approach when it passed
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, but Illinois is much
stricter in its approach.84 Problems particularly may arise if it is
found that one of the three convictions relied on by the court as
grounds for termination is later overturned.85 The overturning of
any of the three convictions, for example, could be done based on a
later finding of unconstitutionality.86 Thus, if a parent’s rights to
his or her child are terminated based on three felony convictions,
including one that is later overturned, questions arise as to whether
due process is properly followed if the termination is allowed to
proceed.87 However, the statute as it stands in Illinois must be
followed, unless action is taken to amend or reverse it.88 Therefore,
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community”).
80. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 116 (asserting the need to find parental
unfitness before termination of parental rights can take place).
81. Id. (explaining that the Adoption Act requires that clear and convincing
evidence of unfitness needs to be shown before the state can involuntarily and
irretrievably terminate parental rights).
82. See In re K.B.J., 713 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (noting that the
Juvenile Court Act acts alongside the Adoption Act, with the main goal of
having courts and the state act within the best interests to protect the child’s
wellbeing and general welfare); see also In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 710-11 (Ill.
1993) (establishing that different findings of best interests can be found under
either the Juvenile Court Act or the Adoption Act, but when it needs to be
determined if the child’s best interests are being protected during parental
termination proceedings, it must be determined if the child’s interests would be
best served by his or her potential adoption).
83. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 50/1(D)(i).
84. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (1997); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1.
85. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 134-35 (holding that an overturned conviction,
on the basis of an unconstitutional statute, could not be used against a father
in finding that there were three felony convictions used as grounds to terminate
his parental rights to his minor daughter).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 115 (noting that as following necessary due process provisions in
the parental custodial process, “Parental rights, such as the right to rear one's
children or control their education, are included in the parental rights protected
by the due process clause”); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59 (holding that
the fundamental right to parent “is an interest far more precious than any
property right”).
88. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 115 (explaining that when infringing on the
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the three-strike felony conviction rule in Illinois, as strictly
followed, is subject to debate as to whether it can be expressly
followed when such problems arise.
The Illinois system differs in key aspects from both of the
systems adopted in New Hampshire and California for the
involuntary termination of parental rights. Most notably, Illinois’
usage of the three-strike felony conviction rule creates a strict basis
for the finding of depravity, resulting in the termination of parental
rights, when compared to the case-by-case fact analyses that are
utilized by the court systems in California and New Hampshire.

III. ANALYSIS
The following sections will discuss the issues presented by the
strict standards set out by the Illinois Adoption Act and Juvenile
Court Act, which require automatic termination of parental rights
after it is established that a parent has been convicted of three
felonies.89 Section A will discuss the determination made by the
Illinois Supreme Court that unconstitutional convictions cannot be
used as part of the three-strike determination.90 Section B will
discuss the due process rights of parents in the raising of their
children.91 This section will also assess the due process concerns
that are raised by the three-strike felony conviction rule in Illinois.
Section C will analyze the existing sections of the Illinois system
that comply with due process requirements, absent the three-strike
felony conviction rule.

A. Illinois’ Requirement of Three Felony Convictions for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
In the case of In re N.G., the Illinois Supreme Court
determined it was improper to declare a father (“Floyd F.”) unfit
after he was convicted of three felonies under Illinois law.92 DCFS
fundamental right to parent, courts must be careful before proceeding with the
termination of parental rights); see also In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 514
(noting that in order for the state to find necessary grounds to terminate
parental rights to a minor child, its petition must then include, “an allegation
that the parent is unfit and include the specific statutory grounds on which the
charge of unfitness is based”); see also In re D.C., 807 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ill. 2004)
(holding that only one proper statutory ground is necessary to terminate
parental rights).
89. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i).
90. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 135.
91. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (asserting that in recognition of due process
rights, “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court”).
92. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 110 (noting that the issue is “whether the
circuit court of Will County erred when it terminated Floyd F.’s parental rights
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argued that Floyd F. was unfit, based on a finding of depravity, due
to his three felony convictions; the basis for this finding were the
standards set out under the Adoption Act.93 However, one of the
convictions was later overturned, after it was determined that the
conviction was based on an unconstitutional statute.94 In its ruling,
the Court agreed with the appellate court’s determination and
found that the original basis for depravity was improper as Floyd F.
no longer had the three required felony convictions under Illinois
law.95 The Illinois Supreme Court opined that once the state could
no longer rely on the third conviction, now overturned, “the State
would have failed to meet its burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that Floyd F. was depraved and therefore unfit
under section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act.”96 Further, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that as the statute was found to be
unconstitutional, then it could no longer be used against Floyd F.
when making a basis for terminating his parental rights.97 The
Illinois Supreme Court, therefore, found the original grounds for
termination to no longer be present as the conviction, found to be
unconstitutional, is removed from consideration of determining
whether the father is depraved.98 Thus, in its decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court set the precedent that if a felony conviction is
overturned, then it cannot be used in finding depravity, and
therefore, cannot be used as a basis or finding unfitness to
to his minor child, N.G.”).
93. Id. at 112 (explaining, “The three convictions on which DCFS relied were
a 2008 AUUW conviction, a Class 4 felony; a 2009 conviction for unlawful use
of a weapon by a felon, a Class 2 felony; and a 2011 conviction for being an
armed habitual criminal, a Class X felony arising from an arrest months before
N.G.’s birth”).
94. Id. (noting “the 2008 conviction on which that determination depended
was based on the specific statutory provision struck down by this court as
facially unconstitutional in Aguilar, 2013 IL 122116”).
95. Id. at 120 (explaining that “[b]ecause the finding of depravity depended
on a void conviction based on a constitutionally nonexistent statute, we must,
in turn, reverse that finding,” and that the Court had, “an affirmative duty to
invalidate Floyd F.’s AUUW conviction and to treat the statute on which it was
based as never having existed”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i) (explaining
that depravity of a parent can be found if he or she was previously convicted of
“at least 3 felonies under the laws of this State or any other state, or under
federal law, or the criminal laws of any United State territory; and at least one
of these convictions took place within 5 years of the filing of the petition or
motion seeking termination of parental rights”).
96. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 120.
97. Id. at 116; see also People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ill. 1990)
(noting that an unconstitutional statute can no longer be considered as having
existed or used in any way once the determination is made to overturn it
(quoting People v. Manuel, 446 N.E.2d 240, 244-45 (Ill. 1983)); see also Van
Driel Drug Store, Inc. v. Mahin, 265 N.E.2d 659, 661 (Ill. 1970) (stating that, if
it is found that part of a law is no longer constitutional, then the existing law
can stand, with the stricken part removed from the statute and no longer used
by the state or the court in enacting any decisions).
98. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 134.
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terminate parental rights.99
In its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court argued that allowing
for an unconstitutional statute to stand and be used in terminating
parental rights, raises due process concerns.100 As noted by the
Court, “[Illinois] seeks to use that unconstitutional conviction to
secure an additional sanction: termination of Floyd F.’s parental
rights. Those parental rights are fundamental.”101 Furthermore, the
Court found:
Because a natural parent’s right to raise his or her child is a
fundamental liberty interest, involuntary termination of parental
rights is a drastic measure. Where a parent has not consented to
relinquishment of his or her parental rights, a court has no power to
terminate the parent’s rights involuntarily except as authorized by
statute.102

Therefore, it is a drastic measure to terminate one’s right to
his or her child, and the Illinois Supreme Court cautions the state
from violating the due process rights of parents in using the threestrike felony conviction rule.103 Thus, if the court makes a finding of
depravity, leading to a finding of parental unfitness and
termination of parental rights, does the three-felony conviction rule
act in accordance with the parent’s fundamental liberty
interests?104 If Illinois is allowed to continue in its use of the threestrike felony conviction rule, is the fundamental right to parent
protected when problems arise?105 Based on these questions, it will
need to be determined whether the three-strike felony conviction
rule, as it currently stands, is in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.

99. Id. at 116 (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court needed to answer if
the now unconstitutional statute could be used “in determining whether DCFS
had met its burden of establishing that Floyd F. was unfit within the meaning
of the depravity provisions of section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act and, on that
basis, terminate his constitutionally protected parental rights,” and it explained
that it could not be used).
100. Id. at 114-15; see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (asserting that in recognition
of due process rights, “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court”).
101. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 114 (alteration in original).
102. Id. at 115 (quoting In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 516).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. But see Matter of Welfare of HGB, 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981)
(explaining that although there is a fundamental right to parent, the state is
within its rights to terminate parental rights when it shows there is sufficient,
serious reasons to justify its decision).

298

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:187

B. Due Process Rights and the Liberty Interest in Raising
Children
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees
that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”106 Further protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is a citizen’s
guaranteed right to substantive due process and procedural due
process.107 According to the theory of substantive due process, “the
Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . .
fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.”108 For procedural due process, there are
two steps that must be analyzed under the Due Process clause: “[w]e
first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which
a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures
followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient.”109 Therefore,
a state can infringe on one’s fundamental liberty interest if it has a
compelling reason for doing so and if it is shown that it followed
adequate procedures.110
Additionally, all citizens have liberty interests that are
protected by the United States Constitution.111 One such liberty
interest that is protected for all citizens in the United States is that
of “a natural parent’s right to raise his or her child.”112 Thus, a
parent’s right in raising his or her child is protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.113 The United States
Supreme Court has noted that one of its primary concerns is
attempting to keep the child with his or her natural parents,
without significant interference.114 Furthermore, the Supreme
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Swarthout v.
Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011).
108. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)).
109. Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 219 (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490
U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).
110. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721; Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 219.
111. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 114-15 (quoting In re M.H., 751 N.E.2d 1134,
1139 (Ill. 2001)).
112. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 115.
113. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (holding that “the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,” and it
further notes that the Supreme Court has taken steps to protect families and
the right to parent under the Constitution (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978)).
114. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944)) (finding that parents have a special bond with children and the
United States Supreme Court recognizes the importance that “the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
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Court has noted that parental rights, and the caring for one’s
natural children, are some of the most important, and longest
regarded rights of citizens in the history of the United States.115
Therefore, it is clear that the right to raise one’s own child is a
fundamental liberty interest, guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.116
1. Illinois’ Three-Strike Felony Conviction Rule Creates
Uncertainty with Potential Due Process Right Violations
Illinois’ three-strike felony conviction rule presents
uncertainty in allowing for three felony convictions to be used as
instant grounds for a finding of depravity, resulting in the
termination of parental rights.117 The Illinois Supreme Court
recognizes that parental rights are fundamental.118 However, if a
parent’s rights are terminated based on three felony convictions,
but one is later overturned, the due process rights of parents are
violated by the state if the court’s decision to terminate is allowed
to stand.
Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court finds that if it is
determined that a statute or law is unconstitutional, then it cannot
be relied on by the courts in any way and the statute must be
disregarded.119 The Court also notes if it were to allow overturned
convictions to be used against parents in the termination of
parental rights, then courts would be in violation of the guaranteed
right to parent under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause and a parent would be deprived of this fundamental liberty

freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder”); see also In re Haley D., 933 N.E.2d 421, 426-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)
(noting Illinois’s recognition of the fundamental right to parent as following
Supreme Court decisions that protect this important interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
115. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (explaining “the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by [the United States Supreme Court]”(alteration
in original)); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (asserting
“[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition”).
116. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
117. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i).
118. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 115; see Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 530
(Ill. 2000) (stating that “under United States Supreme Court precedent,
‘parents have a liberty interest in bearing and raising their children’” (citing
People v. R.G., 546 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Ill. 1989)). But see In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d
763, 768 (Tex. App. 2012) (limiting the fundamental right to parent as not being
unlimited and recognizing that courts must recognize that the wellbeing of the
child is still paramount over the fundamental right to parent).
119. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 134.
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interest.120 Therefore, by allowing an overturned conviction to be
used against a parent in involuntary termination of parental rights,
the parent would lose due process rights as a result.121
Yet, Illinois continues to attempt to follow its very strict
approach that any three felony convictions are automatic grounds
for termination.122 However, the case of In re N.G. presents the
predicament that Illinois is in when it acts to deprive a parent of
the right to his or her child based on an overturned conviction.123 If
the overturned conviction is allowed to be used as part of the state’s
determination of unfitness, this will be a clear violation of the
parent’s due process rights.124 Once the conviction is overturned,
the conviction no longer exists, and the court is unable to
constitutionally use the conviction against the parent as grounds
for termination of parental rights.125 Thus, the substantive due
process rights of the parent would be clearly violated as there would
be no compelling constitutional interest in terminating parental
rights once the unconstitutional conviction is removed from
consideration.126
2. Illinois’ Three-Strike Felony Conviction Rule and Strict
Scrutiny
In defense of its use of the three-strike felony conviction rule,
the state may argue that the statute must stand against a test of
strict scrutiny as it has a compelling interest in protecting children
from parents convicted of felonies.127 Here, the state will argue,
based on the theory of substantive due process, that it has a right

120. Id. at 133 (assessing Floyd F.’s case and finding, “The issue here is
whether Floyd F. is fit to be a parent. Insisting that Floyd F.’s prior AUUW
conviction be given effect in this proceeding would not advance any firearmsrelated public safety concerns. It would have no impact on firearms policy or
public safety at all”).
121. Id. (noting that if the court were to allow the use of unconstitutional
statutes and convictions against a parent, the court would be allowing a
conviction that is no longer there to be used as grounds to terminate the
fundamental right to parent, violating the United States Constitution).
122. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i).
123. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 133.
124. Id. at 134.
125. Id. at 133.
126. Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 219.
127. See, e.g., Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 532 (explaining that the state has an
interest in protecting children under its authority of parens patrie, especially
when it comes to traumatic events that may have a devastating impact on
children); see also In re J.J.Z., 630 A.2d 186, 193 (D.C. 1993) (asserting that the
doctrine of parens patriae allows courts to act on behalf of children to protect
their best interests). But see State ex rel. A.V., 164 So. 3d 853, 856 (La. Ct. App.
2014) (narrowing the right of parens patriae to apply only to serious
circumstances when the state seeks to be allowed the right of “intervention in
the parent-child relationship”).
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to infringe on the right to parent.128 In making this argument, the
state will assert that the termination of parental rights, despite the
conviction being overturned, is still in the best interests of the
child.129 However, the state fails to provide a showing that the
statutory provision of three felony convictions is narrowly tailored
to justify its compelling interest in protecting children and
providing for the best interests of the child.130 Once the conviction
is overturned, the issue continues as to how the statutory provision
is narrowly tailored, where Floyd F. could be convicted of one more
felony and have his parental rights involuntarily terminated.131 If
none of these felonies have to relate to a child, then how are the
child’s best interests served when the parent’s rights are
terminated? Therefore, if the state attempts to use the best
interests of the child as the single factor justifying the termination
of parental rights, it would disregard the fundamental right to
parent and violate the Due Process Clause.132

C. Illinois Provides Other Bases for Terminating Parental
Rights, Aligning with the Due Process Rights of
Parents
Despite the use of three felony convictions as grounds for an
automatic finding of depravity for termination of parental rights,
Illinois provides other bases that act in accordance with a parent’s
right to due process, guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.133 For example, Illinois allows for abuse and
neglect, abandonment, and desertion to be used for a finding of
128. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721. But see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 (finding,
“the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental
right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge
believes a ‘better’ decision could be made”); see also Francis C. Amendola et al.,
Procedural Constitutional Rights in Termination Proceedings, 40A TEX. JUR. 3D
FAMILY LAW § 1677 (2020) (noting the increased need for due process, especially
procedurally, when a state seeks to terminate parental rights).
129. But see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the asserted state interest of the best interests of the child as a proper
compelling interest provided by the state when it attempts to justify its actions
under strict scrutiny).
130. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 110 (the court failed to find the best interests
of the child was a sufficient basis to terminate the parental rights of N.G.’s
father once the single conviction was overturned).
131. Id. at 135 (holding that the trial court would have to establish a
different basis for terminating parental rights, as the original grounds of three
felony convictions no longer stands).
132. Id.
133. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i); see also John Bourdeau, Loss of
Forfeiture of Right, 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT & CHILD § 34 (2020) (noting that in
recognizing the best interests of the child in termination proceedings, the state
has a right to step in when parents are deemed unfit, but it must support its
decision to do so).
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unfitness, leading to termination of parental rights.134 Illinois also
recognizes certain crimes against children, the murder of any
person, and aggravated battery as bases for termination.135 Here, it
is clear that the state would be justified in terminating parental
rights in accordance with the best interests of the child.136
Therefore, if one of the convictions falls within the Illinois statute,
a finding of depravity can lead to a determination of unfitness and
then termination of parental rights.137 In listing the specific
convictions that will grant automatic termination of parental
rights, Illinois still allows for any three convictions together to be
used as automatic grounds for termination.138 However, according
to the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation, the intent of a
finding of depravity is meant to be based on crimes in which
children are victims.139 Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court
found that the main reason for using specific crimes as grounds for
termination was based on the sole concern of protecting children
who have parents with a history of crimes involving child victims.140
Therefore, Illinois provides specific crimes that amount to
automatic designations of depravity, leading to termination of
134. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D).
135. Id. § 50/1(D) (stating that the trial court can make a finding of unfitness
of the parent if it is able to establish that there has been abandonment,
desertion or neglect).
136. See, e.g., In re Jamie M., 714 N.W.2d 780, 786 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights
of her father after he was convicted of murder of her sibling). But see In re Doe,
348 P.3d 163, 167 (Idaho 2015) (asserting that the father’s rights should not be
terminated after the state failed to show substantial evidence to support a
conviction of murder as grounds for terminating parental rights).
137. See In re Donald A.G., 850 N.E.2d 172, 174 (Ill. 2006) (finding a father
as depraved and terminating parental rights “due to a felony conviction for
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child”); see also In re Gwynne P., 830
N.E.2d at 514 (analyzing the lower court’s decision and finding a determination
of unfitness was proper because of the mother’s repeated incarcerations and, “a
single
alleged
ground
for
unfitness
is
sufficient
to terminate a parent's rights where it has been established by clear and
convincing evidence”).
138. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i) (stating that in attempting to establish
grounds for a depraved parent, before parental rights are terminated, the court
can use a finding that there are three felony convictions, based on any federal
or state law).
139. In re Donald A.G., 850 N.E.2d at 179-80 (dissecting the Adoption Act
to mean that the legislature intended to protect children from parents who were
found to have committed crimes where children were victims, including
depravity found based on convictions for murder of a child); see also In re D.T.,
818 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (Ill. 2004) (explaining the standard for terminating
parental rights is a finding of unfitness under the Adoption Act, which must be
found before any action can be taken to sever the relationship between a child
and parent).
140. In re Donald A.G., 850 N.E.2d at 180 (analyzing the reasons for specific
crimes being listed and the legislative intent was to ultimately protect children
and their well-being, especially where parents have committed crimes against
other children).
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parental rights.141 However, in using the three-strike felony
conviction rule for terminating parental rights, the Illinois system
fails to recognize the due process rights of parents.
It is logical that the Illinois Supreme Court and state
legislature provide bases for terminating the parental rights of
individuals, relating to crimes where children are victims. However,
if the state is truly following substantive due process and still
attempts to use the three-strike felony conviction rule, problems
will arise when the state attempts to provide a compelling interest
to deny the parent his or her fundamental right in raising the
child.142 In following this strict rule, none of the three crimes have
to relate to children.143 Therefore, the Illinois system of terminating
parental rights leads to uncertainty and inconsistency. As the
system stands, parents can potentially be denied their fundamental
liberty interest in raising their children, despite the child not being
the victim of the parent’s crime.144 Also, the parent can potentially
be denied this right when three convictions lead to termination, but
the state may later have no basis for termination if a conviction is
overturned.145 However, in situations of abuse and neglect, parents
are afforded more protection than in situations where termination
is made based on the parent’s conviction of three felony
convictions.146
In analyzing the due process concerns of parents alongside the
current system for the termination of parental rights in Illinois, it
is clear that the state should adopt reforms to its current system.
Although certain provisions may stand, Illinois should adopt
broader approaches and remove current provisions that create due
process violation concerns. Therefore, Illinois should look to the
statutes and systems used in New Hampshire and California to
provide broader bases for the termination of parental rights.

141. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i).
142. But see Bourdeau, supra note 133 (explaining that due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment allows for termination based on a finding of
unfitness of the parent, but the best interest of the child can also be used in the
court’s determination).
143. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i).
144. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 134.
145. Id.
146. See In re D.F., 802 N.E.2d 800, 803 (Ill. 2003) (finding a mother as unfit
out of abuse and neglect of the child, but the parent is allowed nine months to
show that he or she has attempted to mitigate circumstances that led to the
original order for the child to be taken out of the home); see also 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 50/1(D)(m) (asserting that unfitness can be found when the parent fails,
“to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the
removal of the child from the parent during any 9-month period following the
adjudication of neglected or abused minor,” and can also be found when the
parent fails, “to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the
parent during any 9–month period following the adjudication of neglected or
abused minor”).
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IV. PROPOSAL
This section will propose that Illinois should disregard its
current system of the use of the three-strike felony conviction rule.
The problems presented by the three-strike felony conviction rule
were recently presented and left inadequately addressed in the case
of In re N.G.147 If Illinois and other states use number-based
systems of convictions as automatic grounds for termination of
parental rights, they face the potential violation of the United
States Constitution and the possibility of acting against the best
interests of the child.
In place of the three-strike felony conviction rule, Illinois
should adopt provisions from state statutes in New Hampshire and
California. Section A will assess the need to disregard Illinois’s
three-strike felony conviction rule as being non-compliant with the
due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment
and not in the best interests of the child. Section B will describe the
parts of New Hampshire’s state statute that Illinois should adopt
as part of its system of terminating parental rights. Then, Section
C will present the provisions of California’s state statute that
Illinois should adopt and then address how the Illinois system will
then stand with the necessary changes that are proposed.

A. To Ensure Compliance with the Due Process Rights of
Parents, Illinois Should Forgo its use of Three-Strike
Felony Conviction Rule as Automatic Grounds for
Depravity and Termination of Parental Rights
Illinois should strike down its use of the three-strike felony
conviction rule in order to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.148 The liberty interest a parent has in raising
his or her child will be automatically terminated if the parent is
convicted of any three felonies.149 This specific provision allows
state courts to forgo any argument that considers the best interests
of the child. This broad basis creates uncertainty and offers the
parent no recourse in protecting his or her right to raise the child.
As a result of the three-strike felony conviction rule, Illinois courts
have been left with discretion to decide what should happen if a
conviction, used as a basis for termination of parental rights, is later
overturned.150 All other provisions of the Illinois system may stand,
147. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 135.
148. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i) (setting forth the provision that any
three felony convictions can be used against a parent in Illinois in order to
establish a finding of depravity, to be further used as grounds for termination
of parental rights).
149. In re N.G., 115 N.E.3d at 134.
150. Id. at 135.
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as these sections relate directly to effects on the child, where abuse
or neglect are used as grounds, or specific crimes are offered as
grounds for termination.151 However, in place of the three-strike
felony conviction rule, Illinois should adopt the broader bases that
other states provide when it comes to determining whether criminal
convictions should be used in terminating parental rights.
Therefore, a specific number of convictions should not be used as a
sole basis to terminate parental rights. In particular, adoption of
legislation mirroring that of New Hampshire and California would
provide significant, important additions to the Illinois system in
order to serve the best interests of children and to protect the
fundamental liberty interests of parents in raising their children.

B. Illinois Should Adopt Relevant Sections of the New
Hampshire Statute and System of Terminating
Parental Rights
Illinois should adopt sections of the New Hampshire system
that govern the determination of whether to terminate parental
rights. The New Hampshire system recognizes not only that the
type of individual conviction be assessed to determine whether the
parent is fit, but also the length of incarceration that results from
the criminal conviction.152 However, New Hampshire makes clear
that the incarceration of the parent alone may not be the sole basis
for termination of one’s parental rights.153 Furthermore, New
Hampshire allows the court to consider the effects that the
termination of parental rights has on the child’s best interest.154
New Hampshire also specifically recognizes the need to protect
the essential due process rights of parents in raising their
children.155 In its system, parents are guaranteed the protection, in
151. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i) (asserting that depravity can be
determined based on charges of murder, solicitation, sexual assault of a child
and sexual battery of a child).
152. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(vi) (2020) (specifying that
convictions can be used as a basis for termination of parental rights, but these
convictions must be assessed by the state to see if it has an effect on the child
or whether incarceration time that results from a conviction of the parent would
ultimately have an actual, adverse effect on the child due to the physical
absence of the parent).
153. Id.
154. Bourdeau, supra note 133; see In re Noah W., 813 A.2d 365, 371 (N.H.
2002) (discussing the idea that the child must be the primary and important
concern of the court when deciding whether to terminate parental rights and
must be of the upmost importance before removing the child from the care of
his or her natural parents).
155. See In re Baby K., 722 A.2d 470, 473 (N.H. 1998) (describing that
“parental rights are ‘natural, essential, and inherent rights’ within the meaning
of the State Constitution,” and “[b]ecause of the significance of this interest, to
terminate parental rights, due process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the same burden of proof required for criminal conviction and
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the interest of due process, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
must be shown in order to terminate parental rights.156 This
protection, if added to Illinois’ system, will provide parents with the
same protections provided to them in criminal trials.157
Beyond recognition of the due process rights of parents, Illinois
should also adopt New Hampshire’s intense focus on the best
interest of the child as a primary consideration in the court’s
decision whether to terminate parental rights.158 Beyond looking at
the fitness of parents, the best interests of the child is important as
he or she will be affected most by the decision the court makes.159
Therefore, Illinois must recognize, as New Hampshire does, that a
conviction, recognized as meeting the grounds for termination, must
be final and all appeals must be exhausted by the parent.160 Once
all criminal procedures and appeals are exhausted, then Illinois
may proceed with deciding whether a parent is depraved or unfit
and whether parental rights should be terminated. If Illinois were
to keep its three-strike felony conviction rule, then children would
be left hanging in the balance as a parent exhausts all appeals of
each of the three felony convictions. These protections, rather than
incarceration”) (quoting State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387, 1388 (N.H. 1978))
(alteration in original)); (alteration in original); see also In re Noah W., 813 A.2d
at 371 (finding that due to the importance of a termination proceeding and the
effects it will have on the child and the parents, “due process requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to terminate the parent's rights”).
156. In re Noah W., 813 A.2d at 371.
157. Id.; see Joan Bohl, “Those Privileges Long Recognized” Termination of
Parental Rights Law, the Family Right to Integrity and the Private Culture of
the Family, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 323, 324 (1994) (arguing in favor of a
reasonable doubt standard for a finding of parental unfitness in order to protect
the best interests of the child before making the decision to terminate parental
rights involuntarily). But see Theresa D. Legere, Preventing Judicially
Mandated Orphans, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 260, 268 (2000)
(advocating against the arguments of other commentary that the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the necessary standard for the termination
of parental rights, as it arguably does nothing to actually protect children and
families in requiring this heightened standard of evidence).
158. In re Baby K, 722 A.2d at 473 (recognizing that when the trial or lower
court decides whether to terminate parental rights, it must make that decision
as quickly as possible in order to ensure that the best interests of the child are
protected).
159. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that
when deciding what is in the best interests of the child during a parental
termination hearing, the court will consider various factors, with the child’s
interests at stake being the most important consideration). But see Brian C.
Hill, The State's Burden of Proof at the Best Interests Stage of a Termination of
Parental Rights, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 557, 575 (2004) (cautioning that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized only that there is the fundamental
right to parent, but no fundamental rights have been found for children when
children are faced with the termination of parental rights of their parents).
160. See In re S.T., 151 A.3d 522, 533 (N.H. 2016) (finding the conviction
process needed to be final, where all appeals must be exhausted before the court
can use a conviction as its primary grounds for terminating one’s parental rights
to his or her child).
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the three-strike felony conviction rule that currently stands in
Illinois, would provide better protections for the parents, in the best
interests of the child, and in accordance with the due process rights
of parents.

C. Illinois Should Adopt Relevant Sections of the
California Statute and System of Terminating
Parental Rights
Illinois should also adopt the broader standards utilized by
California’s system in terminating parental rights.161 Rather than
three convictions being used as grounds for an automatic finding of
depravity for the termination of parental rights, California allows
for a case-by-case determination.162 By adopting California’s caseby-case approach, Illinois will be able to decide whether a particular
parent’s crimes truly yield a finding of unfitness of the parent and
ultimately decide whether parental rights should be terminated.
Using the California system, Illinois can then focus on the parent’s
criminal record and decide whether this is a relevant factor in
finding the parent unfit, rather than instantly deciding that three
felony convictions are automatic grounds for a finding that the
parent is depraved, and ultimately leading to the involuntary
termination of parental rights.163
The use of a parent’s criminal record will serve as a factor the
court can consider, along with those already in place in Illinois, to
ensure the child’s best interests are served and to determine
whether the parent is truly unfit.164 Illinois should also recognize,
as California does, that underlying facts of the crime should
demonstrate why the parent is unfit.165 By determining whether the
individual crime makes a parent unfit, the state will not have to use
a very specific three-strike felony conviction rule in its decision

161. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a).
162. Id.
163. Id. (noting that prior crimes of the parent can be used when deciding
whether to terminate parental rights, to the extent that prior crimes have an
impact on the child’s best interests and general welfare); see also Elizabeth
Williams, Cause of Action to Terminate Parental Rights of Incarcerated Parent,
67 CAUSES ACTION 2D 1 (2019) (expanding the idea of how incarcerations
impact the court’s decision to terminate parental rights in showing that the
court can consider the impact the period of incarceration would have on the
parent’s role in caring for the child).
164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i).
165. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a)(2); see, e.g., In re Baby Girl M., 135 Cal. App.
4th 1528, 1542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that if the court is going to rely on
§ 7825(a) to terminate parental rights, then the facts and details of the felony
conviction being used by the court must be sufficient to justify termination of
the parent’s rights to his or her child; this should be used when further
considering whether the decision to terminate parental rights would be in the
best interests of the child).
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whether to terminate parental rights.
Additionally, Illinois must recognize the general definition of
“unfitness” as California does, to make clear for its courts to
determine whether termination of parental rights should occur.166
This broad definition will allow courts to make a determination of
whether the parent is truly unfit on a case-by-case basis.167
Currently, Illinois provides specific grounds for a determination of
parental fitness, but the state has no general definition in its
statute to show what unfitness is.168 Furthermore, this definition
will allow Illinois state courts to have discretion, based on the facts
of a case, to decide whether a parent is truly unfit.
Illinois should also keep in place its list of specific convictions
that are automatic grounds for termination of parental rights,
thereby staying aligned with California’s.169 Furthermore, it is
important that Illinois also allows, as it currently aligns with the
California system, that the abandonment or abuse of another child,
and the mental disability of the parent, serve as bases for the
termination of parental rights.170 Yet, sufficient facts must be
shown in each case to give the court a basis to deny the parent’s
parental rights of the parent.171 Only once sufficient facts are
shown, serving the state’s interest in finding a parent unfit, can the
state then proceed in deciding whether to terminate parental rights.
In sum, the Illinois system will be changed with the removal of
the strict three-strike felony conviction rule. In its place, Illinois
should employ case-by-case analyses for each case concerning the
termination of parental rights. By implementing fact-based
analyses, rather than stricter approaches, Illinois will alleviate due
process concerns and be able to individually assess the fitness of
parents and the best interests of the child when determining
whether to terminate parental rights in each case. As it currently
stands, Illinois’ use of the three-strike felony conviction rule is not
narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interest of protecting
children and their best interests.172 Accordingly, convictions
166. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a); see also In re Christina P., 175 Cal. App. 3d
at 133 (defining unfitness in the state court system as “a probability that the
parent will fail in a substantial degree to discharge parental duties toward
child”).
167. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a); see In re Charlotte D., 202 P.3d 1109, 111415 (Cal. 2009) (finding it was in the best interests of the child to terminate the
parental rights of the father after a finding of abandonment of the child).
168. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(i).
169. Id.; CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825(a).
170. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b).
171 In re Carmaleta B., 579 P.2d 514, 521 (Cal. 1978) (asserting sufficient
facts must be shown and past acts of the parent can be used when deciding
whether to terminate parental rights, along with any other necessary present
circumstances).
172. But see Jana Micek, supra note 52, at 569 (arguing that judges are given
a great amount of discretion when considering which crimes can serve as a
proper basis for termination of parental rights).
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relating directly to child victims will be left in place as grounds for
automatic termination. By leaving the list of crimes in place, the
protection of the child will be held firmly in place in regard to a
parent’s history of crimes relating to children. However, due process
concerns will be alleviated once the three-felony felony conviction
rule is stricken from the current Illinois system.

V. CONCLUSION
Illinois’ current system of three felony convictions being used
as automatic grounds for a finding of depravity to terminate
parental rights has produced uncertainty in the state’s system.
Illinois needs to revise its system, not only to protect the children
that are left hanging in the balance based on the uncertainty
created by overturned convictions but also to protect the due process
rights of the parents involved. Illinois’ three felony conviction rule
goes against the guaranteed liberty interests of parents in raising
their own children. By adopting the relevant sections of the
California and New Hampshire systems, Illinois can correct its
unclear and inconsistent system of terminating parental rights. If
Illinois leaves its system as it currently stands, the state will be left
with violating the due process rights of parents. Illinois’ current
system allows certain convictions, which have no effect on the child,
or have been overturned, to be used as a basis for terminating
parental rights. The uncertainty created by the system has left
courts to decide what to do after parental rights have been
terminated, despite the overturning of a conviction that was
originally used in the determination. In allowing for a case-by-case
analysis in the termination of parental rights to find whether a
conviction truly makes a parent unfit, Illinois will correct its
system, and will no longer maintain a system that violates the due
process rights of parents.
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